Single transferrable vote

[alan_fincher]

From Trustees' Progress Report (783kB) linked to from C&RT Timeline

5.10 Co-Options

 

5.10.1 Co-Options exist for Council to select members who will as individuals bring skills,

expertise or outlook, or represent interests and activities that are otherwise absent.

 

No decisions need to be made at this stage but activities and interests not already

selected include:

 

Restoration of Waterways

Freight

Youth

 

5.10.2 The focus of selection for Co-Options is more on the individual and what he or she

may offer rather than organisational interests. Nevertheless, organisations may be

approached to assist identifying individuals with the specified skills, experience or

qualities

That doesn't seem entirely consistent with another source that says WRG get an automatic place.

 

I don't object to "restoration" getting more than one place, but if the WRG doesn't represent "restoration", then what on earth does it represent ?

[Higgs]

Doesn't work that way though, with the single transferable vote.

 

If every IWA member who is eligible to vote gives them a vote as one of 4 preferences, and votes for nobody else, then it will indeed take a lot to defeat them, and all might easily get elected as a block.

 

Of course every eligible IWA member will not do this, but it illustrates the point.

 

I'll leave it to Dave to do the actual maths!

 

I would even hope that some current IWA supporters, as long as lapsed supporters choose to think this is not a good idea, and to look for other candidates. There isn't exactly going to be a whip to find them out, is there ?

 

 

IWA are just being bloody greedy to field four members. If they'd offered two, I'd be less inclined to think that they just want as much power as possible, excluding any opposition.

 

The IWA already have a link to BW; a setup, with 4 IWA boating council members, a cosy setup.

Edited December 20, 2011 by Higgs

[alan_fincher]

Actually, even if every IWA member block votes for IWA candidates, they would still need to make up 80% of votes cast to get all the seats.

 

Not voting for anybody else in 5th place and beyond doesn't change things materially (it simply means that the quota falls in later rounds)

It is not, of course, though as simple as those who will vote for "all IWA" candidates, and those who will vote for "no IWA" candidates.

 

I have already had people indicate to me they might (say) vote for the two of us, and two picked from the IWA "slate".

 

I'm not even sure it is worth getting my brain around what the effects of each individual's voting choices might mean, or that it is terribly helpful to do so.

 

Some voters will undoubtedly feel that the name of the IWA has carried enough clout over the years that they should just block vote for these 4. Others will clearly feel otherwise, and look for alternatives.

 

It is clearly important that voters are offered other candidates, who focus on the "boat owner" aspect, independent of the aspirations of organisations that may either have a much wider, or in some cases a much narrower, agenda. This is what we, and no doubt many others, are doing.

 

However, it is clearly encouraging if the voting system and the maths make it harder for anyone to push a whole slate of candidates through just because they have a large membership, but where their membership by no means represents boaters as a whole.

Edited December 20, 2011 by alan_fincher

[Nine of Hearts]

A,B,C,D,Z = 200 votes

A,C,D,B,Y = 210 votes

A,D,C,D,Z = 190 votes

C,A,B,D,Z = 150 votes

Y,Z,A,D,C = 150 votes

Z,Y,A,B,D = 100 votes

 

Must admit I have never bothered my pretty little head about STV before, but now I've had it explained, what a load of **** it appears to be. Instead of doing all that elaborate maths, why wouldn't you just score first place votes as 5, 2nd as 4 etc. and then add up the scores? Seems simpler and fairer to me. In Dave's illustration, A,B,C and Y get elected. D comes nowhere, yet he (she?) is the 3rd most popular candidate going by appearance on voting slips. Everyone placed "D" somewhere on their ballot paper, less than 50% put "Y" on their papers. I've drawn a squirrel on mine in protest.

[Higgs]

However, it is clearly encouraging if the voting system and the maths make it harder for anyone to push a whole slate of candidates through just because they have a large membership, but where their membership by no means represents boaters as a whole.

 

In the boaters group, the IWA will not be offering an IWA rep. Four places for four independent candidates. In reality, IWA candidates will not be able to voice opposition to to their' IWA positions, once voted into the council. Having one's cake and eating, I'd say.

They don't really fit the criteria and are unsuitable for the boaters group.

 

IWA members can not function on the council for the sole purpose of boaters. These positions are for boaters. IWA should have no members on the council; one, absolute maximum.

 

With three IWA members in the boaters group, the IWA will be calling the shots for boaters. That would probably seem like a good deal for the IWA.

Edited December 20, 2011 by Higgs

[mayalld]

Must admit I have never bothered my pretty little head about STV before, but now I've had it explained, what a load of **** it appears to be. Instead of doing all that elaborate maths, why wouldn't you just score first place votes as 5, 2nd as 4 etc. and then add up the scores? Seems simpler and fairer to me. In Dave's illustration, A,B,C and Y get elected. D comes nowhere, yet he (she?) is the 3rd most popular candidate going by appearance on voting slips. Everyone placed "D" somewhere on their ballot paper, less than 50% put "Y" on their papers. I've drawn a squirrel on mine in protest.

 

Basically, STV seeks to find the "least objectionable" candidate.

 

The maths is fairly mind numbing, but it can be seen to be objectively fair, if you argue about it long enough.

 

To show how it produces a "fairer" result, let us consider the simplest case of STV.

 

In this example, there is only 1 position to be filled, and only 4 candidates. STV in such cases is usually known as AV (alternative vote), and the redistribution of surplus can never happen, because once there is a candidate elected, the count is over. There is simply the redistribution of votes for eliminated candidates.

 

Let us consider an election, with 100 people voting.

 

39 of them Want Blue to win, and would be very unhappy if Red won.

29 of them want Red to win, and would be very unhappy if Blue won.

30 of them want Yellow to win, and would be very unhappy if Blue won.

2 of them wants Green to win, would rather like red and would be very unhappy if Blue won.

 

In a classic first past the post election, blue would win, despite the fact that 61% don't want them. The only way to avoid it would be for Red and Yellow to do a deal in advance, to avoid splitting the anti-Blue vote.

 

Under STV(AV), people vote as follows;

 

39: B,Y,G,R

29: R,G,Y,B

30: Y,R,G,B

2: G,R,Y,B

 

The quota is (100/2)+1 = 51

 

Round 1:

B 39

R 29

Y 30

G 2

 

Green is eliminated

 

Round 2:

B 39

R 29+2 = 31

Y 30

G 2-2 = 0 ELIMINATED

 

Yellow is eliminated

 

Round 3

B 39

R 31+30 = 61 ELECTED

Y 30-30 = 0 ELIMINATED

G 0 ELIMINATED

 

So, despite being third place on first preference, Red is clearly the best compromise candidate

[KevMc]

Basically, STV seeks to find the "least objectionable" candidate.

 

...snip ....

 

So, despite being third place on first preference, Red is clearly the best compromise candidate

 

And no-one gets who they wanted

edited to say : oooppps clearly i ddidn't read it properly ... a few people get what they wanted

Edited December 20, 2011 by KevMc

[mayalld]

And no-one gets who they wanted

edited to say : oooppps clearly i ddidn't read it properly ... a few people get what they wanted

 

 

Yes, less people get what they REALLY wanted most of all, but conversely, less people are subjected to the worst possible outcome for themselves.

 

Essentially, the yellow supporters aren't going to get what they REALLY want, under any system. This system means that they get to vote for something that is less bad than what they might get under FPTP.

[Albion]

Basically, STV seeks to find the "least objectionable" candidate.

 

The maths is fairly mind numbing, but it can be seen to be objectively fair, if you argue about it long enough.

 

To show how it produces a "fairer" result, let us consider the simplest case of STV.

 

In this example, there is only 1 position to be filled, and only 4 candidates. STV in such cases is usually known as AV (alternative vote), and the redistribution of surplus can never happen, because once there is a candidate elected, the count is over. There is simply the redistribution of votes for eliminated candidates.

 

Let us consider an election, with 100 people voting.

 

39 of them Want Blue to win, and would be very unhappy if Red won.

29 of them want Red to win, and would be very unhappy if Blue won.

30 of them want Yellow to win, and would be very unhappy if Blue won.

2 of them wants Green to win, would rather like red and would be very unhappy if Blue won.

 

In a classic first past the post election, blue would win, despite the fact that 61% don't want them. The only way to avoid it would be for Red and Yellow to do a deal in advance, to avoid splitting the anti-Blue vote.

 

Under STV(AV), people vote as follows;

 

39: B,Y,G,R

29: R,G,Y,B

30: Y,R,G,B

2: G,R,Y,B

 

The quota is (100/2)+1 = 51

 

Round 1:

B 39

R 29

Y 30

G 2

 

Green is eliminated

 

Round 2:

B 39

R 29+2 = 31

Y 30

G 2-2 = 0 ELIMINATED

 

Yellow is eliminated

 

Round 3

B 39

R 31+30 = 61 ELECTED

Y 30-30 = 0 ELIMINATED

G 0 ELIMINATED

 

So, despite being third place on first preference, Red is clearly the best compromise candidate

 

Dave, can you help with the explanation of this one please? Unless I'm missing something I'm puzzled why B never gets any allocation from the quota and also all other eliminated votes are allocated only to R (the initial second place candidate) until such time that R's votes exceed those of B and R is elected. B just seems to stay static until overtaken which seems an odd way of demonstrating democracy. What am I missing?

Roger

[GeoffS]

Dave, can you help with the explanation of this one please? Unless I'm missing something I'm puzzled why B never gets any allocation from the quota and also all other eliminated votes are allocated only to R (the initial second place candidate) until such time that R's votes exceed those of B and R is elected. B just seems to stay static until overtaken which seems an odd way of demonstrating democracy. What am I missing?

Roger

 

 

Because Red Yellow and Green voters all detest Blue so nothing is transferred to him/her. They all would rather have one of the the others before Blue.

[andy3196]

That doesn't seem entirely consistent with another source that says WRG get an automatic place.

 

I don't object to "restoration" getting more than one place, but if the WRG doesn't represent "restoration", then what on earth does it represent ?

Alan, my understanding having read the whole report (which could well be wrong, so I would advise everyone to read it all themselves) is that the WRG are being offered a seat on the council this time only as a representative of volunteers, and will not get it in the future as a record of volunteers is to be created and will in the future lead to a vote. Also, I don't think there is a requirement for one of the co-opted members to be connected with restoration, and it will be up to the council, once it exists, to decide where extra experience is needed and seek suitable members.

 

It was probably a bad idea of mine to quote only a small part of the report, losing the overall context in the process.

[KevMc]

Yes, less people get what they REALLY wanted most of all, but conversely, less people are subjected to the worst possible outcome for themselves.

 

Essentially, the yellow supporters aren't going to get what they REALLY want, under any system. This system means that they get to vote for something that is less bad than what they might get under FPTP.

 

I guess it's a system that allows people to vote against someone rather than for them - you might say its the little guys ganging up on the popular fellow ... just another way for the politicians to convince us that we are getting our way

[Albion]

Because Red Yellow and Green voters all detest Blue so nothing is transferred to him/her. They all would rather have one of the the others before Blue.

Yeah (in Dave's example you know people's likes and dislikes) but surely there is nothing on the ballot paper that says 'I vote for' and 'I detest x, y or z'?

Roger

[alan_fincher]

As I understand it if (say) 80 different candidates appear on your ballot papers, (not impossible, as the only requirement to be able to stand is 10 sponsors), then if you really want to when you vote you will be able to rank the entire lot in the order of your preference, right down to number 80.

 

I think that's correct, isn't it ?

[Cheshire cat]

It feels like it will all end in tears.

 

I anticipate there will be a dispute about the way the votes get transferred.

 

I don't dispute the way Dave has explained it but I do worrry about whether the adjudicator is thinking aong the same lines.

[adam1uk]

It feels like it will all end in tears.

 

I anticipate there will be a dispute about the way the votes get transferred.

 

I don't dispute the way Dave has explained it but I do worrry about whether the adjudicator is thinking aong the same lines.

 

The rules of STV are very well established, and the ERS is well used to applying them. It's not as if they're making up the system as they go along.

[mayalld]

Dave, can you help with the explanation of this one please? Unless I'm missing something I'm puzzled why B never gets any allocation from the quota and also all other eliminated votes are allocated only to R (the initial second place candidate) until such time that R's votes exceed those of B and R is elected. B just seems to stay static until overtaken which seems an odd way of demonstrating democracy. What am I missing?

Roger

 

What you are missing is that democracy is about what the voters want to happen.

 

The Yellow and Green voters don't want Blue to win, so they put it last. They put Red second.

 

When their first choice is eliminated, the vote passes to the second choice.

 

Effectively, it says "The man you want isn't going to win. Given that you can't have him, who would you like"

 

It feels like it will all end in tears.

 

I anticipate there will be a dispute about the way the votes get transferred.

 

I don't dispute the way Dave has explained it but I do worrry about whether the adjudicator is thinking aong the same lines.

 

Given that the adjudicator is ERS, and what I have described is the way ERS runs STV, I'm pretty sure that the adjudicator is thinking the same way.

[Albion]

What you are missing is that democracy is about what the voters want to happen.

 

The Yellow and Green voters don't want Blue to win, so they put it last. They put Red second.

 

When their first choice is eliminated, the vote passes to the second choice.

 

Effectively, it says "The man you want isn't going to win. Given that you can't have him, who would you like"

 

Does this mean then that, to take a ridiculous case of say 1000 candidates, it is mathematically important to rate each and every candidate right down to the last one or will the vast number of choices for the electorate and the tendency to give up and not vote for any more than (say) your first 5 choices mean that lower order choices are, in practice (but not mathematically), less important?

Your example was a good one but had every elector rating all candidates right down to the last one which might not happen in real life.

Roger

Edited December 21, 2011 by Albion

[mayalld]

Does this mean then that, to take a ridiculous case of say 1000 candidates, it is mathematically important to rate each and every candidate right down to the last one or will the vast number of choices for the electorate and the tendency to give up and not vote for any more than (say) your first 5 choices mean that lower order choices are, in practice (but not mathematically), less important?

Your example was a good one but had every elector rating all candidates right down to the last one which might not happen in real life.

Roger

 

I ignored the possibility of failure to rank down to the last choice (actually to 1 less than the number of candidates), because it makes an already complex subject more complex.

 

If your choices are exhausted, your ballot (or part ballot) becomes non-transferrable, and effectively becomes an abstention, and is ignored.

 

There are some further complications, because non-transferrable votes lead to something called the "effective quota", which is always less than the quota established at the beginning, which takes acount of the reducing number of votes in play.

[Cheshire cat]

The rules of STV are very well established, and the ERS is well used to applying them. It's not as if they're making up the system as they go along.

 

I didn't intend to imply that they were making it up. I have no doubt the governing body are conversant with the rules. I doubt that most of the candidates are familiar with the rules, and even less so the electorate.

 

Perhaps I should have reserved judgement until I see the quality of the communication that comes with the ballot paper.