Mike Todd

I don't think that what you say is inconsistent with what I wrote and you cited.

Sorry I should have made it clear that I had actually read BruceInSanity's reference not just quoted it. If you cannot find the link I will expand.

The Equality Act 2010 listed a number of Protected Characteristics and one of these is Pregnancy and Maternity. It is clear that the provisions under this heading relate to discrimination arising from a woman being pregnant and the immediate consequences of giving birth (including stillbirth). These benefits are specifically restricted to 26 weeks after the date of giving birth, and there is specific protection for breast feeding. There is no mention in the Act (AFAIK) of paternity and so I suspect that a court would normally expect to restrict its attention to matters that arise from the physical and mental consequences of pregnancy and giving birth, especially as it limits the ability of the woman to access services or to return to work. Parenthood is not mentioned as a protected characteristic. AFAIK, the Equality Act does not, as far as I can see, lay any duties with regard to the provision of Education (Schools specifically) other than on the providers ie controlling bodies and local authorities. There does not appear to be any more general duty to enable children to access a school (eg transport providers do not have to offer positive discrimination in the respect). (They, along with all service providers) have to treat other protected characteristics fairly) Land-based parents have to cope with non-trivial travel distances, especially in rural areas. Up to three miles there is still the assumption that children can walk there! At times when 'popular' schools are over-subscribed then some children may have even further to travel and it is the duty of the parent to ensure that this happens - or to provide alternative education, such as home schooling.These distances probably lie in the grey area between definitely not CC compliant and obviously compliant. However, it is clear that parents can legitimately be expected to enable their canal-resident children to attend school and also to engage in some regular movement. There is no requirement on anyone to provide employment within a given distance from home (alas!) and many, many people commute for well over an hour each way each day. AFAIK, access to benefits as a result of unemployment impose a quite stringent test for availability fo work, such as daily work seeking activity and very regular attendamce at job centres (or whatever they are called today!) The issue of indirect discrimination (which seems to be inherent in the matter under discussion) is always complex and depends on showing that there is a causal link between some act or inaction by a service provider or public body in the way in which their terms and conditions impact on a protected characteristic differentially. (It is not enough to say that all users/employees are equally badly affected - that might involve a recourse to Human Rights Act) A high profile set of cases related to discrimination on religious grounds of uniform regulations by certain employers (can employees wear any form of religious symbol, cam employees demand to wear hijab or even burka) These have gone either way and depend on fine detail, sometimes, I recall, relating also to Health and Safety issues. IANAL As an individual, I find that I am often conflicted between, on the one hand, my inherent belief in Human Rights, and the consequent Equality provisions, and, on the other hand, that extreme, sometimes seemingly frivolous, claims have led to growing support for a government to abolish many of these rights. (It seems that The Sun shines on the Right not the Righteous!) A fundamental problem with Rights is that there is no absolute basis for them (save for some a recourse to Natural Law) and depend on a state to enforce them. That, in turn, depends in a democratic society, on the willingness of the majority to grant such rights. We are rapidly discovering that the 'will of the majority' is not necessarily a guaranteed route to civilised society.

Although Local Authorities are often also the Planning Authority, these roles are slightly distinct and - I think - there are rules which indicate a degree of firewall that is needed. For example, LA's have to apply tot he Planning Authority just as does any other building developer/modifier.

I like the abbreviations - and some people thought that they only began as part of text-speak! Perhaps we can start our own Bell Ringing Society (ticks that trigger someone's bell) and here are some suggestions that might help get around any bans on 'political' comment: GTDHD: Johnson on Trump RTBS: May on Brexit OFM: Brexiteers (or, if that does not ring you bell then Remainers or even, as by Chris Bryant, rejoiners) SP: Johnson on Farage Only joking!

But surely Patrick is wrong: the option to not have a home mooring has a prerequisite that the boater can convince 'The Board' that they are engaged in a bona fide navigation (ie journey). The 14 day rule is somewhat incidental to this and, in any event, affects all boaters. The question of distance relates to 'convince the Board' and, whilst they cannot under the legislation say what boaters must do they are allowed to say what action will not convince them the the prerequisite has been met. There is a large grey area in between.

What EU legislation relates to this case?

There is widespread misapprehension that the disability requires public bodies to make any or all adjustments demanded of them. In fact the qualifier 'reasonable' is very important. Many listed and also protected buildings were constructed long before accessibility was assessed on today's standards and the owners of such buildings sometimes have to agonise over the differing requirements of the disability and heritage lobbies and authorities. Adaptations are usually possible but can be disproportionately expensive - hence the need to consider 'reasonable'. Also, there are times when a little bit of lateral thinking is needed, rather than have a stand-off over the first, more obvious, solution to be presented. After all, it is the accessibility that is the issue not that adaptation. I suspect that an attempt to park a caravan permanently on double yellow lines on the basis that access to nearby schools was a protected characteristic would be met with limited enthusiasm! Instead, it would be entirely within the Act to respond that there are plenty of ways in which the individual can comply with reasonable restrictions (that are themselves not drawn discriminatorily) that also meet their personal needs. Given the determination of some lobbies to achieve the outcome Alan fears I suspect that this is one that will end up with a judge having to make a decision of Solomon. Sad, really, as court judgments rarely achieve the best outcome all round as it is usually better to seek compromise rather than a winner-takes-all determination. In the specific case of allowing different movement patterns in term time from holidays, I doubt whether this would be an end to the matter if the parents then also claimed the need to be in one place to be able to work to support their children. Perhaps one solution would be to re-form a charity (as was not unusual in the freight carrying days of liveaboard families) to provide a basic education to children on the cut itself. The only statutory requirement is that children receive an education not to go to a specific school. I would want to hear more specifically about any case that claimed that they could not meet the CC rules on the basis of disability but could do so with a reduced test. After all, the rules only require one movement every 14 days and, as it stands, there is unlikely to be any enforcement action if that move is only an hour or so in navigation. If a person cannot manage that then they, I suspect, are unlikely to be able to match any movement requirement. The more worrying outcome is that a court judgment (and it would require an appeal to a higher court to establish this) determined that the Equality Act overrode the Waterways Act and hence the CC option becomes no longer available. Everyone would then be required to have an authorised permanent mooring. Anyone not able to comply with the 14 day rule would not be able to leave that mooring. Given that there are possibly more people who (sadly) would support that outcome (ie the abolition of CCing) than oppose it, then it might not be a given that CaRT would appeal such a ruling to a higher court. Make no mistake, I am not advocating that outcome but just trying to point out that sometimes people should think things through when they push a legal situation to its limits. Winning battle is not the same as winning a war! Could adopt?

If seat cushions are really totally watertight then they must also be airtight. Surely this will make them very uncomfortable as there will be no 'give' in them, allowing them to shape to whatever sits upon them?

But see https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/555338/port-freight-statistics-2015.pdffor a different perspective.

As I understand it, that was indeed a problem and used by unscrupulous wealthy to keep their servants in order - threatened with not only losing a job but also a place to live. Most would have been live-in, or at least in a tied cottage on an estate.

Are you making the assumption that there is an equivalence between 'main navigation channel' (MNC) and the section to be dredged? Section 10 (and I admit not to having read the other pdf's as yet) does accept that the MNC is sometimes constructed with sloping edges so that at the extreme of the MNC then it is not actually navigable in the sense that a boat can continuously move along it. Fraenkel does not propose dredging the whole channel out to the towpath of equivalent edges, even though they are considered part of the MNC. Have you also given thought to the significance of 'main' in the phrase MNC? Unless it is tautological, then there have to be non-main navigable channels. I'm not sure how they might fit into the argument (from any perspective).

Coroners appear to be quite good at extrapolating from samples of one.

I would have thought that careful thought needs to be given to use of paras 10.5.3 and 10.5.4, albeit that they were originally written in an effort to explain why BW did not have fully to maintain towpaths!

Therein may well lie the problem - mixing imperial and metric measurements. There are too many people (some who should know much better) who think that common approximations (like 25 mm = 1 inch) are accurate. Sometimes it does not matter but in others only a small difference (2%) makes all the difference. (Like engineers who think that pi really does equal 22/7!) After all, at 6 inches the difference is 2.4 mm which could ensure that a chimney does not fit where the expectation is quite tight.

I think you are saying much as was. The registration does relate the right to navigate and moor even though it does not itself confer the right. Absent the registration then the right may not be exercised. (NB saying that two things/people have a relationship does not itself indicate the direction or nature of that relationship) (I think that your post 32 says much the same.

The term 'pastoral' is not specific to religious activities. Most (all?) schools now have pastoral care systems in place, and use that term. In general the term is about giving advice and help concerning personal matters (very wide in scope!)

I am not sure how picky the judge might have been in the words used but as you cite them they do use 'relate to' rather than 'confer'. That is to say, the impact of having or not having a licence is on the right to navigate rather than mooring.

Nigel: are you conflating two different situations: 1. Where a public body does not have powers given by statute or by other means such as being a beneficial owner, it then needs to seek statutory powers (as in the Richmond situation) 2. Where a public body was not given specific powers nor did it have general (eg common law but not exclusively) rights removed by statute, it can continue to act as the beneficial owner (as in the case of Trotman) I'm not commenting on the merits of either case but they do seem to me to have crucial differences.

From the NBTA web site: The NBTA seeks to represent the interests of all live aboard boat dwellers – “Bargee Travellers” – in respect of pursuing the lifestyle upholding minority demographic rights lobbying at both central government and local government levels defending the legal rights of members assisting (as far as possible) with marine emergencies and engagement with the local community As far as I can see that does not include a principal aim of dealing with pastoral matters for anyone using the canal. I am unclear whether, in practice, it aims to act on behalf of its members. But I don't want to overstate my case.

As far as I can see, public bodies, such as EA, are in general subject to common law duties as much as anyone else, except that the founding statute may exempt them from certain common law provisions. (If not specified then they apply) The responsibilities of EA are in part common law duties (such as relating to flooding) and in part statutory ones, alongside statutory rights - permissions - to act. I assume that it would inequitable to say that common law applies in respect of duties but not in respect of rights. I have not looked, but your argument would require you to demonstrate that the EA statue specifically excepted them from benefiting from the rights of beneficial land owners to seek remedy for trespass. If this analysis is correct then the EA action - in this case anyway - does not amount to an extension of powers as they existed already. Even if not frequently used.

It may be a small point but you still misunderstand: I am not saying that the Waterways Chaplains are the only organisation allowed (or claiming) to provide support (exclusivity) but I am saying, unless and until someone gives a case to contradict (which has not yet happened), that they are the only (ie exclusively - not exclusivity) organisation whose founding purpose is to provide care for canal users, boaters included, especially those living at the margins of society. I would be highly delighted if you can cite a counter example. However, a lot of the difficult cases that from time to time are discussed here and elsewhere show just how little support there is for those canal users who find themselves in need. I could bang on about it . . . . my current concern(and recent events including today) show how self-focussed our society and its decision making has become. It seems that the only criterion used to judge specific policies is 'what is in it for me'. If it does not yield 'me' a net gain then 'I' am agin it. Sadly, most canal users who are in need are not members of other societies who are in a position to lobby for policies in their benefit. Hence, if anyone suggests spending public money in this area, then too few people see it as being in their interests and so oppose it (a marked change from opposing only those things that are especially against my interests) The reaction to CaRT's decision to appoint a single Welfare Officer for the whole network was hardly overwhemingly supportive.

I don't think anyone was 'claiming exclusivity' - which would imply a right to deny others the opportunity to participate. What I certainly did say is that as far as I am aware, this is the only organisation dedicated to the welfare of boaters, especially those in difficulty. Of course they are not the only sources of help. I am sure that the lead Chaplain would be grateful of any additional input and would be highly delighted if society were so arranged that there were no people living on or near the canals in desperate straits, either financially, emotionally, health or spiritually. But I guess that is not something on today's agenda . . .

There was a thread about the legitimacy of this (albeit on the Thames) just a little while back.

Suggestions for a modern form of stone,paper,scissors: Brexit, Trump and . . . ???