But the RCR doesn't currently say a fat lot in detail about electric propulsion and LFP battery/system design -- and even if it did, it probably wouldn't have stopped this fire happening, assuming it was a combination of a component problem (battery/BMS/firmware) and a system design/configuration/setup problem (insufficient BMS integration, wring choice of setup for charger).
Which is seems is what happened, even though this boat was "professionally" designed and built -- and the builder presumably thought it was fine and safe (though they were mistaken...) and presumably signed it off as compliant.
The fundamental problem is that it seems there are only two ways to build a truly safe LFP/BMS system -- the first is to build it entirely from components from a single supplier (e.g. Victron) who have designed all the bits to work together properly and thoroughly tested them and locked down critical settings so users can't mess with them, the second is to rely on the skill of whoever put the system together from disparate components to make sure everything is done correctly and set up properly -- and then on the user not to mess with it, if it's not locked down so they can't do this.
The second case can be done by either professionals (e.g.. Finesse) or knowledgeable amateurs (e.g. @nicknorman ), but the problem is that it's pretty much impossible for any BSS inspector/checker to verify that they've done properly this without a deep understanding of all the possible components/programming and a deep dive into system settings.
And in that case the real problem is distinguishing systems put together safely by such "experts" from ones put together less safely by YouTube posters -- or possibly the firm who built the ABC boat, given what happened and what has been said about "reconfiguration" making the day boats safe again.
Which rather suggests that the way this is going -- probably driven by insurers, and ignoring the fact that this still only happened once and there are thousands of boats out there where this hasn't happened -- is going to be a requirement for either "professional" installation (which is likely to mean some kind of examination/certification process to stop the ABC problem happening again) or a certified inspection regime, also by those qualified to do it. That's the way that ABYC is going in the USA, and presumably ISO/RCR will go here.
Even a system from one supplier (e.g. Victron) will need signing off, since there's still nothing to stop it being built with unsuitably-rated components (e.g. cables/fuses) by someone who doesn't know what they're doing. Maybe this could be done at a reduced rate compared to a "home-brewed" system which will need much deeper and more time-consuming investigation, but it'll still need doing.
All this does seem like a level of overkill for one incident compared to all the other accidents -- some fatal, which this wasn't! -- that have happened on boats over the years, but unfortunately it's the way that insurance companies often react to new technologies -- they only look at the new risk even if this is very small (which it is here) while ignoring the fact that they're happy to insure boats built with old technology which is familiar but far riskier... 😞