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LancaCanal

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Everything posted by LancaCanal

  1. The main inflow from the catchment area is, or should be, able to be diverted by sluice gates. Were these working satisfactorily?
  2. I think, but am not entirely sure, that if the inflow sluices had been closed before, or even at the commencement of, the period of unprecedented heavy rain , the 'months worth of rain in 24 hours' would've raised the level of the reservoir by about the three or four inches which fell over the surface area. A few inches should not pose a problem as there should always be some headroom available. Was there any headroom available in the days prior to this event? How much? If not, why not? I am sure some of the many local users of the reservoir could answer at least some of these questions.
  3. The previous on-site reservoir keeper had no need to deal with that type of vegetation, as it was dealt with before it got to that stage - safely and easily. Furthermore, long-term residents of WB have been clear that seeing overtopping and use of the spillway was 'very rare' prior to 2012. Before forecast periods of heavy rain, the keeper would use the sluices to divert the Todd Brook and other inflow, and lower the water level by use of what one person described as 'the gates at the bottom.' Thus sufficient headroom was maintained - enough, when necessary, to cover for periods of heavy rain during the keepers absence and days off. Since 2012, several WB residents have contacted the CRT wrt their concerns about the changes they have observed on and around the dam. Their concerns have been dismissed and they have been told they were 'wrong'. Maybe they were, indeed, wrong, Maybe the breach would have happened even sooner, and more catastrophically, if the keeper had continued diligently keeping the spillway clear of weeds, maintaining appropriate 'headroom' below the spillway, and diverting the inflow according to water levels, expected demand and the weather forecast. Maybe not. I don't know, do you?
  4. That did come to mind, yes. Conversing with BA Systems employees on the subject of the Boeing Max software has been ... interesting ... And of course both merely, and highly, speculative.
  5. Do you mean the sort of software that also detects risky situations, provides warning/alarms, and maybe even 'takes over' in a perceived emergency?
  6. The resident keeper was made redundant some time in 2012, though.
  7. Are there any photos of the dam and spillway's condition in the years prior to the resident reservoir-keeper's redundancy? That might make an interesting comparison to more recent pics.
  8. I have been told that 'Kev' (the dam-keeper/overseer or whatever his title was) was meticulous in his observations 'on the ground' and would use all the means at his disposal to divert flow into the reservoir, and increase flow out of it, during periods of 'unusual' weather conditions. He did everything in his power to minimise or avoid use of the spillway. The frequency and volume of water flowing over the spillway - a rare event during the tenure of dam-keepers in the cottage - alarmed many regular observers in the area, but their concerns were pooh-poohed by CRT. I confess I am now wondering what - if anything - those dam-keepers had learned or grown to suspect, over the years, about the spillway's condition, construction or possible weaknesses. I doubt any official enquiry will uncover that!
  9. Someone who lives in WB has told me the following The reason this has happened is neglect since BW was abolished by the govt and the Canal and River Trust took over without sufficient funding. There used to be a BW employee living in a tied house right next to the dam; he managed the reservoir on a daily basis, controlling the water levels with the side sluices and the gates at the bottom, so there was enough capacity to take extra in when necessary, without it getting to the point of flowing over the spillway which is only meant to happen as a 'last resort'. This employee was made redundant when BW was abolished, and the house was sold. Daily monitoring has thus been lacking for several years; visits and observations for brief periods a couple of times a week is no substitute for daily active management of reservoir levels! People in WB - some of whom knew the BW employee and had helped him in the past - have contacted the CRT over the years with concerns about damage to the spillway when it was overflowing, but were basically told they were wrong. Now it is alarmingly clear that they were right.
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