Here it is:
From Moore vs British Waterways
63. The second point I wish to make is that in considering whether Mr Moore's vessel is moored "without lawful authority" it is important to be clear about the perspective from which the question is asked. In some of the cases to which we were referred the question arose as between neighbouring riparian owners. In Original Hartlepool Collieries Company v Gibb (1877) 5 Ch D 713 a colliery company owned a wharf abutting the River Thames. It was 125 feet long. One of their vessels was 175 feet long, with the consequence that when it was brought alongside the wharf to unload its cargo it overlapped Mr Gibb's adjoining wharf. In order to prevent the overlapping Mr Gibb moored large wooden obstructions to his own wharf which prevented the colliery company's vessel from coming alongside their wharf. Sir George Jessel MR granted an injunction to prevent that obstruction. He held that as a riparian owner the colliery company had a right to access their wharf from the river. That right had to be exercised reasonably, but it was not necessarily unreasonable to access the wharf with a vessel that was longer than the wharf itself. He continued:
"In ascertaining, however, the reasonableness of the acts of the Plaintiffs, one consideration must not be overlooked. Besides a reasonable right of access, they have a reasonable right of stopping, as well as of going and returning in the use of the highway. But what is a reasonable right of stopping? That must depend upon circumstances. You cannot lay down à priori what is reasonable. You must know all the circumstances. It would be clearly reasonable, for instance, if a wheel came off an omnibus in the middle of a highway, for a blacksmith to be sent for to put the wheel on the omnibus if that were the easiest mode of moving it out of the way, and the omnibus might lawfully stop there until the wheel was put on in order to take it out of the way, if that were the best mode of taking it out of the way and a reasonable and usual mode. Nobody would deny that if the blacksmith chose to carry on his trade of repairing omnibuses immediately opposite his own house, and for that purpose, not keeping any one omnibus more than a reasonable time for his work, he kept omnibuses opposite his house or shop, or smithy-door for that purpose, that would be an obstruction of the highway, and would be a nuisance. You must look at the circumstances. So, again, it is perfectly reasonable that A. shall put his carriage before his house door, even although it may overlap his neighbour's door. For instance, take the houses which have been divided—houses in Portland Place —that is a familiar instance to me, and I dare say to most of us—where two doors immediately adjoin. It is impossible to draw up a carriage to the one without overlapping the other. There is no doubt that it is quite a reasonable thing to stop a carriage there for the purpose of taking up and setting down, or even for the purpose of waiting there a reasonable time."